


Regulatory Uncleared OTC Margining

Arthur Rabatin

Head of Counterparty and Derivatives Funding Risk Technology,
Deutsche Bank AG



Liquidity and Funding Risk Conference
London, September 2016



Disclaimer

The document author is Arthur Rabatin and all views expressed in this document are his own and not those of his employer. No part of this document may be reproduced or referenced with prior written consent of the author.

All errors and omissions are those of the author

Arthur Rabatin, London, September 2016

What is Regulatory Uncleared OTC Margining?

- Regulatory Requirement for OTC Counterparties to exchange
 - Initial Margin
 - Variation Marginfor bilateral OTC positions using prescriptive methodology and eligible collateral and collateral haircuts
- Phase-in started with large US broker/dealers Sep 1st 2016
- 2011 G20 Meeting Objective: reduce systemic risk and create level playing field for cleared and uncleared OTC
- Implementation: IOSCO, BIS, ISDA via Dodd Frank, EMIR.

Regulatory Initial Margin

- Initial Margin: Gap Risk Protection
- Implementation Options
 - Schedule based (i.e. Notional based – punitive!)
 - Risk based (ISDA SIMM[®] - VaR based Model)
- Very constrained:
 - Posted Bilaterally (No bilateral netting)
 - Segregated
 - No Rehypothication
 - No netting across asset classes

Initial Margin – ISDA SIMM[®] Methodology

- ISDA Defined Var/CoVar methodology based on trade sensitivities (delta, gamma, vega)
- 99% Confidence limit of 10-Day MPOR
- Defined Hierarchy / Product Types for define scope. Netting only within asset class (no diversification effect beyond asset class). Hybrid products to be classified based on primary risk driver (see SA-CCR)
- Model Governance: Unit Tests; Backtesting

Variation Margin

- VM already common practice and highly standardised (low thresholds, low MTA, currency silos)
- Regulatory VM
 - 2-way Cash
 - MTA US\$ 500K
 - Zero Threshold
 - Daily Margining
- Considerable re-papering effort for potentially large number of counterparties (renegotiate CSAs or sign new regulatory CSAs?)

Industry Standardisation – Dispute Reduction

- Project Blazer
 - ArcadiaSoft / TriOptioma
 - Daily Industry Reconciliation of Sensitivities and IM
- ICE Crowdsourcing Utility
 - Comparison of sensitivities
 - Consensus on risk definition and standardisation
- ISDA SIMM already standardisation compared to original (pre-SIMM) model which allowed firm specific IM calculations

Implementation Phase-In

- Sep 1st 2016 – Initial Margin
 - New Trades / Material Amendments
 - US Counterparties of \geq US\$ 3 Trn Exposure
 - Uncleared Swaps and Security based Swaps – Excluding Physically settled FX Fwds and equity options
- Feb 2017 (?) – Initial Margin
 - Europe putting live US regulation (equivalent)
- March 2017 - Variation Margin new contracts
- Phase-In into Sep 2020

Implementation Challenges

- Significant cross-organisation effort to standardise risk and trade representation
- Timeliness of risk calculation
- Banks traditionally externalised PV for VM but not risk calculation
- Operational Readiness – Collateral Disputes due to complexity of calculation

Collateral Eligibility and Haircuts

Asset class	Haircut (% of market value)
Cash in same currency	0
High-quality government and central bank securities: residual maturity less than one year	0.5
High-quality government and central bank securities: residual maturity between one and five years	2
High-quality government and central bank securities: residual maturity greater than five years	4
High-quality corporate\covered bonds: residual maturity less than one year	1
High-quality corporate\covered bonds: residual maturity greater than one year and less than five years	4
High-quality corporate\covered bonds: residual maturity greater than five years	8
Equities included in major stock indices	15
Gold	15
Additional (additive) haircut on asset in which the currency of the derivatives obligation differs from that of the collateral asset	8


Source: BIS

Funding Implications


- Initial Margin Segregation leading to different dynamics compared to Variation Margin – Research ongoing (see Gregory, Albanese, Hull and White)
- Implicit wealth transfer of creditor seniority from bondholders and shareholders to derivatives counterparties
- Complexities of IM Funding cost calculation:
 - Counterparty Netting Set (Position) vs. Bank ‘Funding Set’
 - Complexity of IM future exposure estimate
 - Funding curve adjustment for Collateral Complexity – collateral cost but also collateral availability

Funding Value Adjustment – Variation Margin

A trading desk facing an uncollateralised client may hedge the position against highly collateralised counterparties, creating funding costs in case of a positive Mark To Market of the client trade.



Funding Value Adjustment – Initial Margin (“MVA”)




Initial Margin Value Adjustment -

Funding Value adjustment of risk based
Initial Margin – VaR calculation for each
Forward PV in Netting Set.

➤ *Computationally feasible?*

Source: <http://www.centrusadvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/image021.jpg>

Initial Margin Implementation



Sources: ISDA, Minimum Considerations for Uncleared Margin Future State Workflow, March 2015

© Copyright 2016 Arthur Rabatin, Liquidity and Funding Risk Conference, September 2016

Summary

- Uncleared OTC Margining, particularly IM has a significant effect in market structure
- The impact is yet to be truly felt due to phase-in (new trades, top counterparties) just started
- FVA is becoming standard (albeit still debated), MVA models developing
- Implementation is data and operational intensive